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RECENT CASES
rule which would truly assure the defendant of a reliable jury determination of
the voluntariness of his confession. The most obvious approach is to have a
separate jury determine the issue of voluntariness. Although this procedure
poses practical difficulties of increased expense and delay it is least vulnerable
to attack on any substantive ground. The defendant would have the issue fairly
and reliably determined by a jury. If they found the confession to be involun-
tary, the jury which ultimately determines guilt or innocence would not know
that a confession existed. Only under a procedure such as this is it possible
to have a jury determination of the issue of the voluntariness of a confession
and be certain that if a confession has been found involuntary, it has not in-
fluenced the convicting jury.
ROEERT W. KELLER
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-INCLUSION OF BRIEFCASE IN "FRISK" DOES
NOT CREATE A CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED SEARCH
Defendant had been under investigation in connection with a matter which
had occurred on June 15, 1959. Incident to this investigation three police officers
went by squad car to the building in which defendant had an office. As they
arrived, they saw defendant approach and enter the building. He was carrying
a briefcase. Two of the officers got out of the car and followed defendant into
the building where they stopped him at the elevator and questioned him about
the "other matter." At the request of the officers, defendant accompanied them
to the parked squad car and entered the back seat. Defendant sat in the middle
with one officer on each side. The third officer was in the front seat on the pas-
senger's side. Defendant placed the briefcase on his lap with the opening facing
him. The officers on either side of defendant proceeded to "frisk" 1 him. Prior
to opening his coat to facilitate the "frisk," defendant placed the briefcase be-
tween his legs. After the "frisk" had been completed defendant picked up the
briefcase and placed it on his lap in the original position. One of the officers
reached over and took the briefcase and placed it on the floor in front of him
and opened it. Inside was a loaded revolver. At the trial defendant was convicted
of illegal possession of a weapon in violation of section 1897 of the Penal Law.
No mention was made as to the "other matter" -for which the investigation was
originally conducted.2 Defendant contended that in the absence of disclosure
of this "other matter" there were no reasonable grounds for his arrest and
therefore the search of the briefcase was illegal. Defendant's motion to suppress
the evidence obtained by the "frisk" was denied. The Appellate Division af-
firmed. The Court of Appeals held, affirmed; one judge dissenting. A "frisk" is
1. A frisk is a contact or patting of the outer clothing of a person to detect by the
sense of touch if a concealed weapon is being carried. People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 446,
201 N.E.2d 32, 35, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458, 463 (1964).
2. The defendant was later indicted and convicted for the acid blinding of his lady-
friend. No mention was made of this at this trial for fear it would be prejudicial error.
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distinguishable from a constitutionally protected search and is justified on
grounds of safety and precaution to the police officers. The inclusion of the brief-
case in the "frisk" did not make this a constitutionally protected search. People
v. Pugach, 15 N.Y.2d 65, 204 N.E.2d 176, 255 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1964).
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution protects "the
right of the people to be secure .. .against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures. .... "3 A search is reasonable within the meaning of this amendment if
made incident to a lawful search warrant,4 by consent,6 or incident to a lawful
arrest." The Supreme Court has determined that in the absence of an arrest
warrant or where the crime was not committed in the presence of the arresting
officer an arrest is legal if made with probable cause.7 Accordingly the court
has held that probable cause exists where "the facts and circumstances within
their (the arresting officers') knowledge and of which they had reasonably
trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reason-
able caution in the belief that" an offense has been or is being committed.8
Throughout the statutes and decisions of the various states the words "reason-
able grounds" are often substituted for "probable cause"; although the phrases
are different the effect seems to be the same.9 This interpretation of the fourth
amendment led the Supreme Court to formulate what is now called the Exclu-
sionary Rule whereby any evidence acquired in an unreasonable search and
seizure cannot be used in a criminal prosecution against the person from whom
it was seized. But until 1938, a citizen of New York had no constitutional pro-
tection against an unreasonable search and seizure. 10 Under this state of affairs
the New York Court of Appeals held in People v. Delore1' that evidence ac-
quired in an unreasonable search was admissible against the person from
whom it was seized. That case expressly rejected United States Supreme
3. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.... ." U.S. Const. amend. IV.
By implication of course, a "reasonable" search does not violate this amendment. Cf. Elkins
v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960) ; United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950);
Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 150 (1947); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925).
4. Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(a).
5. Cf. Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921); Channel v. United States, 285
F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1960).
6. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1961); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S.
98 (1959); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927).
7. Cf. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959) ; Henry v. United States, 361 U.S.
98 (1959).
8. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925). But cf. Draper v. United States,
358 U.S. 307, 311 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (language to the effect that direct, first
hand information rather than circumstantial evidence is required). This language has since
been rejected by the Supreme Court in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
9. See Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
10. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319
(1937); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884). But see Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964). N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 8 (1923) was in effect at this time and adopted the fourth
amendment of the United States Constitution verbatim, however, this was by statute and
not a constitutional guarantee.
11. 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585, cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657 (1926).
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Court cases to the contrary which were binding on the federal government
only.'2 In 1938 New York adopted the language of the fourth amendment into
its Constitution. 13 Yet, even with this constitutional prohibition against unrea-
sonable search and seizure the New York Court of Appeals still retained the
Defore case and allowed illegally seized evidence to be used in a criminal
prosecution against the person from whom it was seized. 1 4 The Supreme Court
sustained this practice, 15 until 1961. In the landmark case of Mapp v. Ohio,16
the Court decided that the "exclusionary rule" as developed in earlier federal
cases must be applied to the states. Therefore, any evidence obtained in an il-
legal search and seizure, i.e., without an arrest warrant, consent or probable
cause, is now inadmissible in a criminal prosecution whether in a state or federal
court.
17
When no reasonable grounds for an arrest exist, and therefore where no
search could be made, some states allow a police officer to stop and "frisk" a
suspect if the circumstances give the officer "reasonable grounds to suspect"
that a crime has been or is being committed and if the officer has reason to
believe the suspect is dangerous.' 8 This position has been adopted in the
Uniform Arrest Act which has been enacted into law by four states.' 9 The
practice of "frisking" a suspect when less than reasonable grounds for an arrest
exist is standard police practice whether or not condoned by a court 2 ° New
York courts in the past were reluctant to accept this frisk-search distinction2 l
but have since endorsed it.2 The New York legislature has codified this dis-
tinction in its recently enacted "Stop and Frisk Law" 23 which authorizes a
police officer to stop a person in a public place, demand that he identify him-
12. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S.
298 (1921); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920); Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
13. N.Y. Const. art. I, § 12.
14. People v. Richter's Jewelers, Inc., 291 N.Y. 161, 51 N.E.2d 690 (1943).
15. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
16. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
17. People v. O'Neill, 11 N.Y.2d 148, 182 N.E.2d 95, 227 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1962); People
v. Loria, 10 N.Y.2d 368, 179 N.E.2d 478, 223 N.Y.S.2d 462 (1961). For a discussion of
the exclusionary rule see generally Day & Berkman, Search and Seizure and the Exclusionary
Rule: A Re-examnination in the Wake of Mapp v. Ohio, 13 W. Res. L. Rev. 56 (1961).
18. United States v. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); State v. Chronister,
353 P.2d 493 (OkIa. Crim. 1960); People v. Martin, 46 Cal. 2d 106, 293 P.2d 52 (1956); cf.
State v. Zupan, 155 Wash. 80, 283 Pac. 671 (1929).
19. Cal. Pen. Code § 833 (1957); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 594:2(1955); Del. Code
Ann. tit. 11, § 1902 (1953); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 12-7-1 (1956).
20. Note, Philadelphia Police Practice and The Law of Arrest, 100 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1182
(1952); Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 Va. L. Rev. 315 (1942).
21. Cf. People v. Esposito, 118 Misc. 867, 194 N.Y. Supp. 326 (County Ct. 1922);
People v. Didonna, 124 Misc. 872, 210 N.Y. Supp. 135 (Ct. of Special Sessions 1925).
22. People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E.2d 32, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1964).
23. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 180-a. This provision became effective on July 1, 1964
and therefore did not apply to the instant case. For a discussion of this law and its con-
stitutionality see Note, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 473 (1964); Ronayne, The Right to Investigate and
New York's "Stop and Frisk" Law, 33 Fordham L. Rev. 211 (1964); Siegel, The New York
"Frisk" and "Knock-Not" Statutes: Are They Constitutional?, 30 Brooklyn L. Rev. 274
(1964).
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self and explain his actions if the officer "reasonably suspects" that such person
has committed or is committing or is about to commit a felony or serious mis-
demeanor. The law further sanctions a "frisking" of the person for dangerous
weapons during questioning, if the officer reasonably suspects that his life is
in danger.24 When a "frisk" is allowed on less than reasonable grounds, either
by statute or case law, its scope must be limited to that which is required for
the protection of the police officer, for a thorough search on less than reasonable
grounds would violate the fourth amendment. The validity of this search-frisk
dichotomy has never been passed on directly by the Supreme Court, although
in Henry v. United States25 the Court intimated that such a distinction could
not constitutionally exist.26 However, the Henry decision has been interpreted
by some courts as an expression of the Court's supervisory powers over lower
federal courts and not as an enunciation of law applicable to the states.27 The
constitutionality of the "frisk" can be reconciled with the language of Henry
if it is read in light of the Supreme Court's policy that the states are free to
formulate their own search and seizure rules as long as they conform to the
"reasonableness" standard of the fourth amendment.2 8
In the instant case the majority of the Court of Appeals emphasizes that
there is a distinction between a "frisk" and a "constitutionally protected search."
A "frisk" conducted before there are reasonable grounds for an arrest may
nonetheless be "reasonable" within the requirements of the fourth amendment.20
The court applies a balancing of interests test; public order and police safety
are to be weighed against the mere inconvenience and slight indignity to the
defendant. Here, says the court, safety and security outweigh inconvenience and
indignity. The majority of the court sees no difference between the facts in
People v. Rivera3" where the weapon was found on the defendant's person, and
the facts in the instant case where the weapon was found in the briefcase which
the defendant was carrying. Accordingly, the inclusion of the briefcase did not
transform this "frisk" into a search. 31
The Court of Appeals in People v. Rivera had described a "frisk" as a de-




24. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 180-a.
25. 361 U.S. 98, 100 (1959). This case dealt with the question of when an officer
could stop a suspect and not when he could frisk him This fact together with the loose
language used by Mr. Justice Douglas leaves the intimation weak.
26. See also People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441 448, 201 N.E. 32, 36, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458,
464 (1964) (Fuld, J., dissenting) (language to the effect that such a distinction could not
exist).
27. Commonwealth v. Lehan, 196 N.E.2d 840 (Mass. 1964); People v. Mickelson, 59
Cal. 2d 448, 380 P.2d 658, 30 Cal. Rptr. 18 (1963); People v. Rivera, supra note 26.
28. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33-34 (1963). But cf. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S.
108 (1964).
29. Instant case at 66, 204 N.E.2d at 177, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 835.
30. 14 N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E.2d 32, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1964).
31. Instant case at 67, 204 N.E.2d at 178, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 836.
32. "The frisk is less such invasion in degree than an initial full search of the person
would be. It ought to be distinguishable also on pragmatic grounds from the degree of con-
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A search is reasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment if there is
probable cause; a "frisk" is reasonable on the grounds of safety of the police
officer. The court in the instant case describes a "frisk" as separate and dis-
tinguishable from a search rather than as a degree of a search.33 This latter
reasoning, if carried to its logical conclusion, poses a very basic problem. The
fourth amendment only protects a person against unreasonable searches, there-
fore if a "frisk" is not a search there would seem to be no constitutional pro-
tection against an unreasonable "frisk." If, on the other hand, a "frisk" is a lesser
degree of a search (People v. Rivera), then it can only be justified as an ex-
ception to the "probable cause" requirement of a search if it is reasonably related
to the safety of the police officer.
This decision represents the furthest point reached by the New York Court
of Appeals in determining the scope of a "frisk." Although this case was not de-
cided under New York's recently enacted "Stop and Frisk Law," 34 the rationale
underlying both is identical, i.e., safety of the police officer. Under this statute,
if the original stopping is justified on the grounds of "reasonable suspicion" it
is apparent that this court will permit a wide range of investigation under the
guise of a "frisk." Such a liberal interpretation of this word does not seem
justified. It is difficult to reconcile the search of the briefcase on the grounds
of safety to the officer, for as Judge Fuld pointed out in his dissent, if the offi-
cers suspected that the briefcase contained a weapon they could have protected
themselves by simply placing the briefcase on the front seat of the squad car
out of reach of the defendant.35 Neither can it be justified under the traditional
definition of a "frisk" as the "running of the hands rapidly over another's per-
son." The rationale of the court in People v. Rivera cannot be automatically ap-
plied to justify the decision in the instant case. The facts in the two cases are
not so similar as to lead to the same conclusion. Once the interpretation of the
word "frisk" is extended to the point where it no longer relates to the safety
of the police officer, the invasion of the individual's rights no longer seems jus-
tified by the "balancing of interests test" to which the court refers.
36
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stitutional protection that would surround a full-blown search of the person." 14 N.Y.2d
441, 446, 201 N.E.2d 32, 35, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458, 463.
33. ". . . a 'frisk' is distinguishable from a constitutionally protected search." Instant
case at 66, 204 N.E.2d at 178, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 836.
34. )N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 180-a.
35. Instant case at 68, 204 N.E.2d at 179, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 837 (Fuld, J., dissenting).
It is interesting to note that the New York Police Training Manual issued subsequent to
the passage of the "Stop and Frisk Law" adopts this procedure as standard police practice.
See Municipal Police Training Bulletin (June 1, 1964).
36. Instant case at 66, 204 NXE.2d at 177, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 835.
